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How To “Talk Left and Walk Right”
in South Africa: Access to Medicines
in the Neoliberal Era




   Introduction
“I am not using strong words; I am using
appropriate words. This is genocide”. 
Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi (De Wet 2014)
 
When the Minister of Health talks left…
1 In  1997,  while  the  AIDS  epidemic  was  spreading,  the  South  African  government
explored changes to its regulation of patents in the Medicines Act and its National Drug
Policy. It triggered a world-famous law case pitting the South African state against a
coalition of  pharmaceutical  companies:  the Medicines Act  case,  which concluded in
2001, also known as the Pretoria trial. 
2 Since the Pretoria trial,  debates on access to antiretroviral  treatments (ARVs)  have
been polarized between activists — supported by the Minister of Health — who urge to
apply exceptions (also called flexibility) to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the global pharmaceutical industry, which is
keen  to  protect  its  interests.  As  a  result,  the  HIV/AIDS  epidemic  has  been  highly
politicized  since  the  end  of  Apartheid,  once  through  denialism  and  then  with  the
massive roll-out of antiretroviral treatments after the Pretoria trial. 
3 Since then, universal access to antiretroviral treatments has been a pillar of African
National Congress (ANC) policy. After announcing constitutional equality, with section
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27 of the constitution introducing access to health as a fundamental principle, the ANC
government  has  tried  to  ground  its  legitimacy  in  the  achievement  of  these  socio-
economic rights, namely through equal access to treatments (Hodgson 2015). Health
Minister  Motsoaledi’s  governance  has  promoted  a  “welfarist”  vision  of  the  state,
framed by the principle of universal socio-economic rights. One of his major proposals
is the implementation of a National Health Insurance in South Africa (NHI): “NHI is a
reflection of the kind of society we wish to live in — a society that will be based in
values  of  justice,  fairness  and  social  solidarity”  (Motsoaledi  2014).  Health  policies
indeed  seem  to  be  used  by  Motsoaledi  as  a  “specific  legitimization  resource  for
governments” (Fassin 1998). According to an industry manager, “every ANC president
has left a legacy: Mandela has brought reconciliation, Mbeki the African Renaissance
and Zuma will bring healthcare.” (Motsoaledi 2015b) As a matter of fact, AIDS response
has been at the core of a broad reform project supposed to lead to the implementation
of  a  National  Health  Insurance  (NHI):  “We  know  by  now  that  there  are  four  (4)
highways along which South Africans are marching to their graves (…).” Among them is
“a huge burden of HIV and AIDS and TB — this is the biggest highway of them all with
many many lanes” (Motsoaledi 2016).
 
… And walks right?
4 Aaron  Motsoaledi’s  mandate  has  been  characterized  by  hyperactivity.  His  reform
project was merely for the show, as demonstrated by the shilly-shallying around the
implementation of NHI or his crusade against patents. Indeed, in spite of its strong
rhetoric, the Department of Health has never resorted to TRIPS flexibility to reduce the
price  of  medicines1,  nor  has  it  developed  alternatives  to  dependence  on  foreign
pharmaceutical supplies. No long-term investment has been made to secure the supply
of antiretroviral treatments in South Africa (Kudlinski 2013) and a strategy based on
attracting direct foreign investment has been favoured. Consequently, in spite of WHO
recommendations,  local  industry  has  developed  little  manufacturing  capacity  and
relies  almost  exclusively  on  imported  Active  Pharmaceutical  Ingredients  (Kudlinski
2013). This situation leads to the Department of Health (DoH)’s strong dependence on
multinational  pharmaceutical  businesses.  Far  from  following  a  developmental
approach to health systems, the Health Minister has designed an access policy based on
a low-cost, rationalized supply, contrary to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
’s industrialization strategy. 
5 The aim of this article is to explore the contemporary dynamics of the public supply of
antiretroviral (ARV) treatments in South Africa. I will show that the development of
ARV treatments has been paradoxically based on the development of the relationships
between the state and multinational business. More precisely, the DoH has deepened its
relations with the latter by establishing the public market as a strategic hub in South
Africa. This way, the South African government has developed a strong influence on
the market of medicines within the territory. This article suggests that, in a resource-
constrained context which questions the country’s capacities for traditional welfarism,
the  DoH  strengthens  its  reach  by  vesting  market  rules.  By  vesting,  we  refer  to  “
institutional work directed toward the creation of rule structures that confer property
rights (Roy, 1981; Russo, 2001). Vesting occurs when government authority is used to
reallocate property rights […].” (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006).
 
How To “Talk Left and Walk Right” in South Africa: Access to Medicines in the...
Angles, 8 | 2019
2
Methodology 
6 There is a wide body of research on the impact of neoliberalism on access to healthcare
and medicines  (for  instance:  McGregor  2001,  Chapman 2014).  Most  of  it  deals  with
structural  adjustment programmes in Southern countries and more recently on the
effects of the financial crises (Legido-Quigley et al. 2016). The common narrative states
that “the neoliberal offensive has had a major disruptive effect on social cohesion, as
well as on people’s lives and morale, especially the most vulnerable” (Karamessini 2012:
176). Moreover,  neoliberalism  would  entail  the  retreat  of  the  state  from  its  social
functions,  as  the  “important  element  of  neoliberalism  is  the  retrenchment  of  the
welfare  dimension  of  the  state,  which  is  seen  as  an  impediment  to  the  optimal
functioning of the markets” (Mladenov 2015: 446). Based on the assumption that the
decrease of public budget expenditure and predatory austerity result in the collapse of
health  policies,  these  studies  overlook  the  concrete  strategies  implemented  to
circumvent these constraints. 
7 This  article  criticizes  such  understandings  of  the  workings  of  neoliberalism.  By
contrast, it is based on the methodological assumption that neoliberalism should not be
studied as the retreat of the state but as a political production which carries specific
social  relationships  (Boyer  2015).  Resorting  to  heterodox  economics  and  sociology
helps  escape  the  black-and-white distinction  between  strong  (welfare)  and  weak
(neoliberal) states developed for instance by varieties-of-capitalism literature (Hall and
Soskice 2001), and sheds a light on a fundamental paradox: it takes a strong state to
engineer its own downsizing. Neoliberal states do not disappear but turn into invisible
market managers and keep steering market forces: 
It is too often forgotten that neo-liberalism seeks not so much the ‘retreat’ of the
state, and an expansion of the spaces of capital accumulation, as the transformation
of state action by making the state itself a sphere governed by rules of competition
and  subject  to  efficiency  constraints  similar  to  those  experienced  by  private
enterprises. […] More profoundly, it signifies a transformation of the ‘format’ and
role of the state, which is now perceived as an enterprise in the service of enterprises.
(Dardot and Laval 2013: 216, 228)
8 As Peck puts it, neoliberalization processes imply the successive “roll back and roll-out
of state functions” (Peck 2013: 447). What it means is that the state does not disappear
but rather restructures its links with all  policy stakeholders: the state as a political
project “is being replaced, not by fresh air and free markets, but by a reorganized state
apparatus” (Peck 2013: 447) which conforms society to market forces. What is at stake
in the analysis of neoliberal states is also a methodological challenge which entails that
we look at “how neoliberalism is specified in a variegated landscape of institutional,
economic  and political  forms” (Peck 2013).  The historical,  sociological  and political
modalities of its reorganization are at the core of the notion of neoliberalism, as Jessop
suggests that we “put neoliberalism in its time and place” (Jessop 2013). 
9 Such an approach of social and health policies in neoliberal contexts has been offered
by  Collier  (2011)  and  Ferguson  (2015).  The  former  looked  at  the  ways  in  which
neoliberalism reshaped social welfarism by investigating post-Soviet Russia; the latter
focused  on  Sub-Saharan  countries.  James  Ferguson  explains  that,  in  a  neoliberal
context, the governments of those countries increasingly rolled out “extensive social
welfare  programs  targeting  the  poor”  (Ferguson  2015:  1).  This  way,  he  takes  the
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opposing view of the narratives which expatiate upon the fact that neoliberalism is
systematically detrimental to welfarism and interventionism (Evans 2008). 
10 Consequently, this article shows that access policies in South Africa are not based so
much on the reform of intellectual property law but on the gradual transformation of
the market according to health priorities and negotiations with industry. I shall resort
to  the  theory of  regulation elaborated by Robert  Boyer.  This  research looks  at  the
arenas of negotiation within the public market of medicines and shows that policies are
horizontally negotiated, between state and non-state actors (Nay and Smith 2002). Such
an approach is inspired by the sociology of regulation, which de-constructs institutions
through the analysis of concrete interactions. 
11 Countries’  trajectories  on access issues have been broadly studied for India (Correa
2013)  and  Brazil  (Sweet  and  Keshab  2013).  The  public  market  of  antiretroviral
treatments is a core issue for access to medicines, all  the more since it is the most
attractive  market  segment  for  multinational  pharmaceutical  companies  in  South
Africa. DoH control over the selection of antiretroviral treatments gives it power over
multinational industrial companies. This article is especially based on the analysis of
tendering processes, with an extensive use of interviews with state department civil
servants and pharmaceutical companies managers. The interviews mainly took place in
Johannesburg and Pretoria in 2015. 
12 This article falls into three parts: the first provides a background on the policy forum
around access to medicines that has developed both at the international and national
levels.  The  second  expatiates  upon  the  case  of  South  Africa,  showing  how  the
pharmaceutical market has gradually been vested by health institutions. The final part
explains how the Department of Health has become the go-to institutional partner for
industry stakeholders. 
 
The rising narrative of access to health in the global
pharmaceutical sector
Conflicting agendas: the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) versus the development of a
right to health
13 Access  to  medicines  has  been  put  on  the  international  agenda  in  a  context  of
globalization of trade rules and commodification of knowledge. The dissemination of
patents in Southern countries has led to a conflictual policy forum.2 In South Africa, the
political will to align with international trade regulations has been at odds with the
necessity to  respond  to  the  huge  burden  of  HIV/AIDS  epidemic  after  a  decade  of
denialism.  The  notion  of  access  to  medicines  emerged  as  a  reaction  to  trade
globalization  and  more  especially  to  the  Agreement  on  Trade-Related  Aspects  of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). At the same time, South Africa came to terms with
Apartheid with a contradictory mandate: ensuring the development of constitutional
and  socioeconomic  rights  by  promoting  a  developmental  state  while  entering  the
global market. 
14 Since then, constitutional equality has been the first achievement of ANC governments
in the Post-Apartheid era (Section 27: Right to Health), but the achievement of socio-
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economic rights has been continuously delayed by the global orthodox agenda. “The
ANC  government  has  been  more  interested  in  confirming  its  presence  on  the
international  scene  and  in  conquering  the  international  market  than  in  ensuring
socioeconomic rights” according to Professor V from the University of Kwazulu Natal
(Professor V 2015). The ANC’s desire to integrate South Africa into international trade
regulations  after  the  end  of  the  Apartheid  embargo  led  to  a  quick  U-turn  in  the
government’s strategy.  The adoption of the Growth Employment and Redistribution
(GEAR) macroeconomic strategy in 1996 has been considered as the starting point of
the neoliberal  era,  as  it  promoted trade liberalization.  As  soon as  the World Trade
Organization  (WTO)  was  created,  South  Africa’s  legislation  aligned  with  the  TRIPS
agreement and also developed strong relations with the United States, with the 1994 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) for instance. In this rather conducive
context, many multinational pharmaceutical companies have invested in South Africa,
obtaining  the  licences  which  had  previously  been  granted  to  local  manufacturers
during Apartheid. 
15 Nevertheless,  the  rising  opposition  from  civil  society  undermined  the  relations
between the state and the pharmaceutical industry. In the second half of the 1990s, the
South African population was facing a growing AIDS epidemic without any access to
treatments in the public health sector, since the government had adopted a “denialist”
position  and  justified  its  refusal  to  provide  the  population  with  antiretroviral
medicines by arguing that Western Industry had brought the disease to Africa to open
new markets (Fassin 2006). Opposition from civil society came to fruition during the
“Pretoria trial” when the South African government, supported by civil society, faced
39 pharmaceutical  companies  in  CCcourt.  This  law case also shed a  light  on access
issues at the international level, as shown by the adoption of the Doha Declaration in
2001.  This  Declaration  aimed  at  strengthening  the  flexibility  of  TRIPS  agreements’
principles and emphasizes states’ right to use this flexibility principle. It epitomized
international debates on global health goods and highlighted the issue of multinational
companies’ social responsibility. 
16 Since then, the narratives around access to medicines have posited a strong opposition
between state and industry. According to these narratives, the state’s duty should be to
limit  intellectual  property rights.  The 1999 report  on the implications of  TRIPS for
access to medicines commissioned by the World Health Organization and the World
Trade Organization (WHO and WTO 1999) was followed by the creation in 2003 of a
WHO  IP  Rights,  innovation  and  public  health.  Its  report  (WHO  2006)  showed  that
patents are not an incentive to innovation in developing countries. In 2008, resolution
WHA61.21/62.16 was passed by the World Health Assembly, calling for the creation of a
global strategy and a public health plan. In 2015, a United Nations’ Secretary-General’s
High  Level  Panel  on  access  issues  was  set  up  to  try  and  strike  a  balance  between
intellectual Property (IP) and health rights. 
 
In South Africa, a policy forum based on a binary vision of
medicines
17 The opposition between access to medicines and patent protection has structured the
policy  forum  in  South  Africa.  A  range  of  reforms  have  aimed  at  redefining  the
respective prerogatives of the state and of industry as regards access to antiretroviral
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medicines.  Nevertheless,  the  attempts  to  regulate  prices  and  competition,  with  for
instance the attempts to implement a compulsory Benchmarking Methodology in the
public  market  or  the  Health  Market  Inquiry  undertaken  by  the  DoH  in  order  to
strengthen the competition law, or Intellectual Property Law have not been successful.
This triggered a series of scandals that the difficulties of Intellectual Property reform
illustrate well. Even though the Doha Declaration insists on the importance of resorting
to TRIPS flexibility to increase access, South Africa is still striving to align its IP law
with the Doha Declaration. In spite of the world-famous Pretoria trial of 2001, many
stakeholders are reluctant to apply the TRIPS flexibility principle to the South African
IP law. 
18 In 2008, under the influence of the Department of Health, the Department of Trade and
Industry  launched  a  discussion  to  align  Intellectual  Property  policy  with  Doha
Principles. A Green Paper came out in 2013 and called for stakeholders’ submissions.
Two main advocacy coalitions emerged: on the one hand, the civil society “triad” made
up  of  advocacy  groups  Section  27,  Treatment  Action  Campaign  and  Médecins  sans
Frontières strongly supported the paper with their campaign “Fix the Patents Law,”
calling for a gradual process of elimination of patents by de-connecting intellectual
property issues from the price of medicines. This “epistemic community” (Haas 1992)
also includes most academics and importers of generic medicines which are generally
produced in India — even if the latter, by shifting to biosimilar production,3 is more and
more  interested  in  patenting  opportunities.  On  the  other  hand,  multinational
companies represented by their industrial association oppose the reform, arguing that
it would not be enforceable, due to lack of capacities. The South African Department of
Science  and  Technology  and  part  of  the  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  also
questioned the IP reform project, arguing that it would lead to major divestment from
South  Africa.  More  discretely,  South  African  generic  manufacturers  promote  the
conservation  of  Intellectual  Property,  since  voluntary  licences  from originators  are
their  major  pipelines.  As  a  consequence,  the  Intellectual  Property  reform proposal
triggered  a  wide  variety  of  positions  which  were  overshadowed  by  the  2014
“Pharmagate,”  when  the  leaking  of  a  confidential  document  from  a  US  consulting
office,  which  outlined  how  major  originator  companies  aimed  to  counter  the
Intellectual  Property  reform  proposal,  caused  a  major  scandal,  contributing  to  an
ostensible break-up between the state and the pharmaceutical industry. Since then, the
promoters of access to medicines have been able to influence industrial stakeholders
more strongly, as will be shown below.
 
Towards organizational change: health institutions at
the core of pharmaceutical-market management in
South Africa
When the pharmaceutical market is vested with the Department of
Health
19 The  striking  politicization  of  health  in  South  Africa  has  resulted  in  the  growing
influence of  the DoH in pharmaceutical  public  markets.  Health is  presented by the
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Health  Minister  as  the  key  to  achieving socio-economic  rights  by  the  fulfilment  of
constitutional rights: 
It  is  particularly  concerning  that  many  participants  appear  to  lack  an
understanding  of  both  the  principles  of  social  solidarity,  and  the  need  for
redistributive justice. These principles are enshrined in the Constitution and are
central  to  redressing  the  pervasive, historically  entrenched  inequality.  It  is
expected  that  stakeholders  will  have  a  variety  of  economic,  political  and
philosophical perspectives, the trend towards a conservative approach that lauds
free  market  principles  is  concerning,  particularly  given  the  internationally
recognised failings of the healthcare market. (DoH 2015: 2) 
20 This use of the Constitution rests on the fact that the legitimacy of the post-Apartheid
state is based on the duty to fulfil the social contract. Health is presented as a catalyst
for equality and, as such, should be accessible to all: 
It is also important that the Inquiry focuses on the notion of health as a public
good. This is important because the State is expected to put into place institutional,
organisational and regulatory mechanisms to support the progressive realisation of
the right to healthcare for every citizen. (DoH 2015: 5) 
21 In South Africa, the Gini coefficient is one of the highest in the world and the claim for
equality is at the core of ANC legitimacy. The NHI does not consist in growing public
investment in health but in the state’s ability to monopolize parts of private capital (in
infrastructures,  skills  and  funding)  to  re-orientate  it  towards  a  system  of  social
solidarity. As a civil servant at the DoH argued, “you know that if poor people do not
manage to reach basic welfare through their jobs and education, they might resort to
violence.” (DoH Civil Servant 2016)
22 Our research shows that the Department of Health appears as an ANC stronghold and
acts as a game-ruler within government. A civil servant from DoH explained that the
DoH had a strong influence on the other departments: “You know it’s easy since we are
from the same party. In other countries like France with many parties they would not
let regulations pass as it happens for me at the Parliament. I hardly meet a resistance
when I suggest a paper.” (DoH Civil Servant 2016) 
23 Improving access to health stands as a central political strategy. It takes the form of a
struggle  against  the  private  health  sector  and  the  re-designing  of  public domain
frontiers — at least symbolically: “NHI is a political decision of a nation hungry for
justice and equality. It is based on political will and should not be subjected to obstacles
driven purely by greed and self-interest of a selected few.” (DoH Civil Servant 2016) It
may  also  involve  the  shaming  of  pharmaceutical  industry:  “Two  years  ago,  I  was
regarded as  exaggerating or  outright  insane by some,  when I  spoke openly against
Pharmaceutical companies that were planning a price onslaught against us. Today, that
onslaught which I had foreseen is here with us.” (Motsoaledi 2015a) 
24 The Department of Health has been redesigning its mandate through its intervention in
the  public  market  of  antiretroviral  treatments.  A  significant  milestone  was  the
relocation  of  pharmaceutical  contracts  into  the  Department  of  Health.  Previously,
medicine procurement in the public sector had been the responsibility of the National
Treasury, which was more broadly responsible for the management of public contracts.
In 2009, a Ministerial Task Team advised that a Central Procurement Agency, directly
responsible towards the Minister of Health, should be created. Its core structure, the
Directorate  of  Affordable  Medicines,  was  approved  in  2011  by  the  National  Health
Council.  From then on, it  started to manage public tenders independently from the
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National Treasury. A, who is a close observer of the government (Observer A 2015),
explained that  a  blame game was going on between the Department of  Health,  the
National Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry. The latter two were put
on the back burner as mere observers by the former, as shown by the example of the
preference  point  system.  Bids  are  awarded  according  to  a  90/10  preference-point
system. 90 points are allocated to price levels and 10 points to the companies’ B-BBEE
status  level  (which  promotes  the development  of  Black  Business  in  South  Africa).
Historically, these B-BBEE points have been promoted by the Department of Trade and
Industry,  using  section  5(2)  of  the  Preferential  Procurement  Policy  Framework  Act
(PPPFA) 2000, in order to improve the trade balance by developing local industry. Even
though an unpublished DTI study showed that 20 B-BBEE points would still  be cost
effective, the Department of Health immediately limited this preferential procurement
by establishing a maximum price which cannot exceed 10% of the price premium. 
25 Moreover, the Department of Health was able to capture a set of regulatory processes
and is consequently omnipresent in current pharmaceutical reforms. For instance, the
Intellectual Property draft was released by the DTI and was supposed to be a trade
issue. Nevertheless, the Department of Health’s influence is strong. As an interviewee
from French diplomacy put it: “Actually it is a DoH paper.” (French Diplomat 2014) Our
research shows that many civil servants at the DTI share views with the DoH and act as
a  relay  for  it.  All  in  all,  the  Department  of  Health  has  gradually  strengthened  its
leadership in the pharmaceutical sector in South Africa by vesting the market. 
 
The standardization of medicines in the public market: a low-cost
policy
26 The DoH resorts  to new-public-management techniques to implement its  universal-
access  policy.  We focus here on the techniques  used to  enable  access  to  medicines
within the public market of ARV treatments. These instruments avoid the controversial
process  to  formulate  political  compromises  and  contribute  to  building  a  specific
framing of access based on new public management. 
27 In order to provide the bulk of patients with generic medicines, the guidelines have
promoted the growing standardization of treatments — more exactly of therapeutic
classes — on the basis of strict equality of patients at the lowest price. The HIV/AIDS
burden  on  the  health  budget  has  kept  increasing,  as  CD4  count  is  planned  to  be
removed as an eligibility criterion4 and PrEP5 is being tried in some programmes for
vulnerable individuals.  This medicine-focused strategy has been a growing financial
burden for the Health budget, as it has increased by 7% to 10% in the last 7 years, while
the Health budget has declined as a proportion of the National Budget (Health Budget
2015). In such a context, the reduction of price per capita has been at the core of the
antiretroviral medicines roll-out strategy; for instance, Y, a chief Manager at the DoH
opened a meeting telling me “do you know that in South Africa we have the cheapest
ARVs  in  the  world?”  (DoH  Manager  Y  2014).  This  means  that  universal  access  to
medicines may be financially feasible only if prices are very low and monitored by new-
public-management  rationality.  As  a  consequence,  the  public  procurement  of
antiretroviral treatments is based on a price-focused selection process.
28 Indeed, the National Drug Policy articulated by the DoH is based on a tryptic: access,
quality and rational use. Access and rational use are defined according to price issues:
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access is  defined as “equitable availability and affordability of essential drugs” while
rational use is said to be “the promotion of therapeutically sound and cost-effective use
of drugs by health professionals and consumers” (National Drug Policy 1996). The issue
of the quality of the medicines is therefore firmly framed by the issue of price: only
affordable medicines are to be provided. The emphasis on prices is omnipresent, as
revealed in a slideshow presented by the Central Drug Programme: 10 slides out of 36
address prices and cost-effectiveness (PTC Workshop 2015). 
29 This  price-focused  strategy  stems  from  a  twofold  movement  of  standardization  of
medicines  and  depoliticization  of  the  selection  process.  Indeed,  it  enables  the
government to focus on the price of medicines and thereby to avoid the broader issues
of  patent  law  and  infrastructural  failure  in  South  Africa.  The process  of  medicine
selection  is  extremely  technical.  An  interview  with  J,  a  manager  at  Central  Drug
Procurement  (CDP)  at  the  Department  of  Health  (CDP),  shows  how  quantitative
medicines selection is: 
We do some pharmaco-economic analysis and the medicine might prove to be cost
effective but we might not be able to afford it. We really look at affordability. So
when we have big shifts in treatments we also look at impact analysis to see what
will  be the impact on the budget.  So something might be cost effective but not
affordable  for  us.  The  question  is:  can  you  use  this  new  commodity  with  your
budget? First we look at the clinical evidence: is it safe? And then we go to the cost
issue. We do a lot of cost minimization. If  you have medicines A and B and the
outcomes are barely the same, we compare them. And then once we know it’s cost
effective we’ll see if it’s affordable for us to use that given the budget that you have.
(CDP Manager J 2015)
30 The semantic fields used in the whole interview are linked to data, bureaucracy, prices
and guidelines. New-public-management techniques are broadly used during the drug
selection. It highlights the focus on efficiency, cost-effectiveness and “optimality”. The
CDP resorts to a range of instruments and techniques in order to objectify the selection
process. The members of the National Essential Medicines List Committee (NEMLC) and
of the Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee (PTC) sign Declaration of Interest and
Confidentiality forms to ensure transparency, and recruitment process are based on
tangible signs of technical skills: most civil servants at the Department of Health have a
PhD  in  Pharmacy  or  Medicine  and  have  an  academic  background.  Furthermore,
medicine standards are at the core of medicine selection: the Essential Medicines List
(EML)  and  Standard  Treatment  Guidelines  ensure  the  standardisation  of  care:
“Guidelines aim to standardise care, reduce local variation (equity), and improve health
outcomes”.6 The methods used to select medicines are based on quantitative pharmaco-
economic analysis such as cost-effectiveness analysis. Evidence-based medicine is also
at the core of medicines selection and shows the technicity of decision-making; the
Essential Drug List (EDL) uses the “Strength of Recommendation Taxonomy” (SORT)
which aims at rationalizing many types of evidence through a unique taxonomy. 
31 The development of a National Health Insurance (NHI) has even increased medicine
standardization. The variety of medicines supplied by the government is to be reduced
thanks to the establishment of therapeutic classes. It means that within a basket of
medicines  with  similar  indications,  only  one  will  be  included within  public  supply:
“these therapeutic classes have been designated where none of the members offer a
significant benefit over the other registered members of the class” (DoH, 2012). The
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Pharmaceutical Task Group, an industrial working group, has noticed in a submission
that: 
the  medicine  options  currently  available  to  patients  in  the  public  sector  are
considerably wider than the Essential  Medicines List,  to  which the White Paper
refers at a number of points […]. The PTG recommends that […] the NHI should seek
to  broaden  the  accessibility  of  different  medicines  for  different  patient  needs,
rather than attempting to ration or restrict this. (Pharmaceutical Task Group 2015:
10-11) 
32 This quote is telling, since it highlights a paradox inherent to NHI: the implementation
of a unique healthcare system, said to be the fulfilment of universal access, is likely to
reduce  the  variety  of  medicines  available  to  patients.  Moreover,  attempts  by  civil
society  to  protect  the  variety  of  supply  come  up  against  closed  institutions  and
practices. For instance, the South African National AIDS Council (SANAC), which is a
platform designed to build a comprehensive response to the AIDS epidemic, does not
always take into account some interventions from civil society, as was suggested by the
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC Provincial coordinator 2015). 
33 . An employee at Doctors without Borders (MSF) South Africa even explained that “any
special medical condition is out of control in the public sector.” (MSF Employee 2015) In
other  terms,  in  order  to  achieve  a  strong political  project,  the  South African state
reduces its prerogatives over medicines in a defined and restricted perimeter.
 
The antiretroviral public market as a nexus between
state and industry
A myriad of relational contracts between the Department of Health
and a few empowered companies
34 In contrast with the transnational policy forum around access presented in the first
part of this article, I now wish to demonstrate that the public market of medicines is a
major  arena  of  negotiation:  this  is  where  already-identified  players  bargain  the
material  and  symbolic  dimensions  of  medicines.  Negotiation  arenas,  where  the
implementation of policy is worked out, are narrower than policy forums. 
35 The  nexus  between  state  and  industry  is  located  within  the  public  market,  more
accurately during the tendering process. The selection of bidders is not merely based
on  cost-oriented  criteria  but  also  on  tight  relationships  between  the  procurement
department and a small number of companies. My study shows that state regulation
consists in the social delimitation of the public market. Since Department of Health
influence over the market of  medicines is  strengthening,  companies attempt to get
closer  to  the  Central  Procurement  Unit  at  the  DoH.  More  and  more  often,  they
underline their links to the public sector and try to act in compliance with the state.
Most  of  my interviewees from pharmaceutical  companies  explained that  the public
sector has become central to their business. As a manager in a pharmaceutical company
asserted, “When NHI is implemented […] It will be the moment when our relations with
the State will count.” (Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2015) Building relations with
the  State  is  critical  to  maintaining  a  minimum  of  predictability  and  to secure
investment  in  some types  of  medicines  such as  antiretroviral  medicines.  The  same
manager explained: 
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Why  do  companies  stick  to  the  state?  Because  there  is  so  much  uncertainty
concerning National Health Insurance. Then, I think that we will have to take more
and more  into  account  the  social  responsibility  required  to  invest  in  emerging
countries. (Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2015)
36 Companies  endeavour  to  get  closer  and  closer  to  DoH civil  servants.  One  of  the
interviewees said that he came to visit the Health Minister at the hospital, while the
aforementioned manager  explained  that  his  company contacted  the  Department  of
Health right after the 2014 Pharmagate: 
We just asked for a face-to-face meeting with the Deputy Director General in order
to show them that we are not opposed to them. We finally agreed on looking at DoH
policy. But DoH was the first state department we came to see. I have to say that
[Name of his company] has been the only one to get a face-to-face meeting with
them. (Pharmaceutical Company Manager 2015)
37 The  growing  importance  of  the  health  public  sector  has  resulted  in  a  strong
competition between industrial stakeholders to access public tenders. The necessity of
cutting costs has implied the selection of foreign generic companies. The procurement
department  —  a  division  within  the  DoH  —  has  favoured  new  types  of  providers,
namely generic multinational companies, generally from India because of their price
competitiveness.  The  public  supply  of  medicines  is  locked  around  specific  policy
brokers  who  come  from  industry  and  try  to  monopolize  the  market  while  they
reinforce the public sector’s purchase power. A civil servant at the DoH explained that
the DoH had developed strategies to attract new importers: 
At that time [in 2008] local companies were the main suppliers. We said: “ok, if you
want us to buy local then give us the money to buy enough medicines for all.” I
went to India and asked them why they were not interested in exporting to South
Africa since we are the biggest market for ARVs. They replied that in South Africa
the public market was only taking local manufacturers.  Indeed, local  companies
were creating pressures on competitors. We decided to change it and we integrated
the Indians into the tenders. (DoH Civil Servant 2016)
38 Therefore, the state’s capacity to implement its policies is essentially linked with its
dependence  on  multinational  generic  companies  which,  by  importing  cheap  Active
Pharmaceutical  Ingredients  (APIs)  from India and China,  are  able  to  provide public
tenders  with  the  cheapest  antiretroviral  medicines  (Kudlinski  2012).  Avoiding
originators and local manufacturers in favour of multinational generic makers has been
essential to the implementation of access to antiretroviral medicines, in spite of the
Department of Trade and Industry’s developmental policies. 
39 These companies would have limited interest in entering low-profit bids with strong
uncertainty, since the ARV tender lasts only two years. By resorting to strategic use of
Black Economic Empowerment, that is to say regulation which promotes the transfer of
stakes in white-owned businesses to a new class of black investors, packaging selection
(which can favour specific providers) and continuous pressure on prices,  the public
tenders tend to favour a limited number of companies through relational contracts.
During the interviews, this category of stakeholders describes strong links with the
state: a CEO of one these pharmaceutical companies evokes a “relationship”: “we get on
well  with  the  Department  of  Health,  we  actually  get  on  well”.  His  emphasis  on
“transparency” and on the predictability of their agreements “we have always been on
tenders since 20 years” shows that the development of the partnership stands for a
long-lasting agreement with the state (Pharmaceutical Company CEO 2015). Moreover,
their relations with the state are not channelled by industrial associations. They resort
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directly to a limited number of key stakeholders at the DoH, as V, an employee of an
industrial association explained:
— Do you resort to an umbrella body to defend your interests?
— Sometimes, it’s better to act on your own. Generally that’s what we do since we
already have strong relations with the government. (Employee V 2015a) 
40 Indeed, V suggested that the relations between the state and businesses have a strong
personal dimension: 
— You see,  the relations that  these  companies  have with the state  are  more …
personal. (Employee V 2015b)
41 These stakeholders also have advisory roles towards the Department of Health and the
Department of Trade Industry. In fact, an employee of Aspen Pharmacare is an advisor
to the Trade Minister. These empowered companies define themselves as “practical”
organizations  which  can  provide  the  state  with  technical  guidance  since,  as  S,  a
manager in such an empowered company argued, “in the DoH, they are all academics
[…] they are a liberation party, they do not know how to design policies.” (Manager S
2015)
42 The government has undertaken the construction of a state-owned plant to produce
antiretroviral  medicines’  APIs  nationally  and  provide  its  entire  population  with
treatments.  Most  of  my interviewees  call  into  question the  government’s  ability  to
understand  market  dynamics.  As  manager  S  argued,  “Government  wants  its  own
facility, it’s indicated in the 10th point of healthcare reform. The big issue is that they
will never manage to supply for all South Africans. This policy doesn’t make any sense,
its unique goal is to appeal to people.” (Manager S 2015) These critical viewpoints show
how  state  and  industry  are  intertwined  in  policy  implementation  and  shows  that
industry is able to engage with health policy-makers. 
 
The public tenders as a state disciplinary apparatus
43 The companies’  position is ensured by an implicit  loyalty towards the state.  If  they
break these relations by adopting an ill-adjusted behaviour, such as setting high prices
or mismanaging their supply chain, they are likely to lose their contracts. In his 2017
budget  speech,  Health  Minister  Aaron  Motsoaledi  offered  a  pungent  criticism  of
pharmaceutical industry’s role on medicine pricing, but ended up listing companies
and private health providers who have been contributing to a Fund. By making these
companies  visible  and  presenting  them  as  models,  the  state  labels  them  as  “good
pupils.”  Contrariwise,  some  companies  can  be  blacklisted  by  the  government.  The
necessity to be seen “on the side of the state” stems from the fear of being frozen out of
the public market.South African company Adcock Ingram, for instance, was suddenly
kicked out of the tenders after its prices were not considered competitive enough by
the tender department. 
44 
All in all, these elements suggest a strong state regulation in the ARV market. Thanks to
the development of  a  benchmarking methodology project  to  ensure low prices  and
even the establishment of a Health Competition Inquiry, the DoH has been able to force
the private health market into complying with price requirements. In 2014, the South
African Competition Commission started a market inquiry to look into high prices in
the  private  healthcare  sector,  which  aimed  at  investigating  the  general  state  of
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competition  in  the  health  market.  This  Inquiry  betrays  the  growing  reach  of  the
National Department of Health which aims at imposing medicines’ affordability even in
the private healthcare sector.  The benchmarking methodology is  a  telling example,
constituting a sort  of  “ghost  regulation”.  As a  civil  servant at  the DoH argued,  the
methodology  has  never  been  really  used,  since  companies  virtually  respect  the
principle of low prices: 
You know, we initially designed an International Benchmarking Methodology for
originators, to control prices. They have to apply by giving prices of their country
markets and then if prices suggested in South Africa are higher, we look into it and
try to investigate. But they do not want to explain why it may be more expensive in
South Africa so they automatically suggest lower prices. We never need to resort to
methodology actually. (DoH Civil Servant 2015)
45 Within the ARV policy arena, industry ends up accepting the rules of the game and
even internalizes control. All in all, industrial stakeholders accept state intervention
not  through  unilateral  domination,  but  by  voluntarily  accepting  specific  rules  and
regulations for determined issues and products in exchange for access to the South
African market. Companies accept these rules in this specific arena dedicated to access
to antiretroviral medicines and let the state have hold on patented medicines as if,
more  or  less  symbolically,  they  were  falling  into  the  public  domain.  The  partial
requalification of medicines as a public good can be observed through the state’s ability
to label medicines as belonging to the public domain, as shown by two examples. The
first  is  the  2008  Intellectual  Property  Rights  from  Publicly  Financed  Research  and
Development Act, known as the IRP Act, which came into effect on 2 August 2010 and
ensures that intellectual property emanating from publicly-financed R&D is protected
and commercialised for the benefit of the people of South Africa, knowing that the
state retains ‘walk-in rights’ for health.7 A second example regards public tenders: an
originator company has granted a patented medicine to the public tenders. It has given
it off label and the state takes care of its commercialization which is usually the purest
expression  of  industrial  property.  As  an  employee  of  this  company  argued,  “that’s




46 The growing commodification of medicines questions the scope of state prerogatives in
the health sector. In such a context, collective action to enable access to medicines is
channelled by critiques of neoliberalism in favour of a traditional vision of the “welfare
state”  as  modelled  by  Esping-Andersen,  announcing  the  imminent  collapse  of
neoliberalism  (Wallerstein  2015).  On  the  contrary,  this  article  shows,  through  the
example of ARV public-sector supply in South Africa, that medicine supply is organized
in accordance with a neoliberal rationality. Indeed, the South African AIDS policy is not
destroyed  but  designed  by  neoliberal  mechanisms.  Indeed,  the  access  policy  is
paradoxically based on a quantitative vision of medicines, which emphasizes its price
and calls  for  an  ongoing  standardization  of  treatments.  These  one-size-fits-all  ARV
medicines  betray  a  macroscopic  vision  of  health,  far  from  an  anthropological
perspective of patients, as a professor at the School of Public Health at the University of
Western Cape argued (UWC Professor 2015). In a resource-constrained environment,
traditional welfarism is replaced by ad hoc mechanisms. In South Africa, this situation
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has resulted in ambiguous but tight relations between state and industry, where the
state has had to engage with industry to implement its access policies, from conflicts in
policy  forum  to  cooperation  in  a  restricted  policy  arena:  the  public  market  of
antiretroviral medicines. The latter has enabled the Department of Health to design
new price standards and to challenge the configuration of patents. As a conclusion, we
suggest that the South African government fulfils its universal access policy by vesting
the market of medicines. This study is in line with Ferguson’s approach of neoliberal
health policies. The author claims that these policies “may be transforming the field of
political  limits  and  possibilities”  (Ferguson  2015). Indeed,  the  South  African
government’s ability to adopt industry’s narratives to weigh in negotiations stands for
a concrete and efficient way of avoiding the bottlenecks implied by litigation around
patents. This behaviour may pave the way for other Southern countries which do not
have strong and independent industrial capacities.
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NOTES
1. The 1997 South African Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act was passed hurriedly as an
alignment to the TRIPS agreement. It took the form of a set of compromises between the two
major parties, which did not incorporate TRIPS flexibilities into the law. 
2. The notions of policy forum and policy/negotiation arena were offered then refined by public
policy  scholars  Eve  Fouilleux,  Bruno  Jobert  and  Pierre  Muller  (Boussaguet  et  Muller  2005;
Fouilleux 2000; Jobert 1994). These authors investigate the ways public policies are legitimized,
negotiated  and  implemented.  Jobert (1994)  makes  a  distinction  between  formal  negotiation
arenas and what he calls policy forums (forums politiques). The notion of negotiation arena refers
to  places  where  individuals  negotiate  the  material  and  concrete  conditions  of  policy
implementation. While the arenas are usually limited to formal processes and decision makers,
How To “Talk Left and Walk Right” in South Africa: Access to Medicines in the...
Angles, 8 | 2019
17
the notion of policy forum applies to broader aspects of policy making. It refers to the places
which are vested by a diversity of actors such as public servants and experts as well as opinion
leaders and the media, in which they incrementally develop common definitions of social life and
common mindsets, by questioning existing rules and creating new ones.
3. A biosimilar is a biological medical product that is almost an identical copy of an original
product, by contrast with simpler, chemical generic medical products.
4. See the abstract of Ford et al (2015): “For more than two decades, CD4 cell count measurements
have  been  central  to  understanding  HIV  disease  progression,  making  important  clinical
decisions,  and  monitoring  the  response  to  antiretroviral  therapy  (ART).  In  well-resourced
settings,  the  monitoring  of  patients  on  ART  has  been  supported  by  routine  virological
monitoring. Viral load monitoring was recommended by WHO in 2013 guidelines as the preferred
way to monitor people on ART, and efforts are underway to scale up access in resource-limited
settings”.
5. Pre-exposure prophylaxis or PrEP is the use of an antiretroviral medication to prevent the
acquisition of HIV infection by uninfected persons. See “Pre-exposure prophylaxis” on the WHO
website: http://www.who.int/hiv/topics/prep/en/ 
6. CPD presentation, Pretoria, June 2015.
7. See the University of Cape Town website: http://www.rci.uct.ac.za/rcips/ip/pfbill. 
ABSTRACTS
One  of  the  modalities  of  access  to  medicines  in  South  Africa  consists  in  the  paradoxical
delegation of regulatory functions to non-state actors — namely, but not only, industry. Drug
policies in neoliberal globalized states are characterized by their insertion into a global trade
system which promotes a growing commodification of medicines. At the same time, calls for the
reform of  national  drug  policies  rise  significantly.  State  formation in  South Africa  has  been
characterized by continuous negotiations and compromises with business, which at first sight
questions the possibility of  access policies.  Opening the black box of  the South African state
amounts to demonstrating the state’s ability to roll out a political project which endeavours to
have the pharmaceutical industry adopt the notion of universal access in a neoliberal context.
This article attempts to shed a light on access mechanisms through the analytical deconstruction
of the public market of antiretroviral medicines as a set of intertwined social relations. In South
Africa,  the role  of  industry,  as  heterogeneous as  it  is,  has been deeply ambiguous and often
denounced by civil society. Still, its role has been critical to ensure the supply of medicines. As a
result,  the  Department  of  Health  has  been  broadly  dependent  on  industry,  regarding  the
innovation agenda, the security of supply and industrial policy.
Une des modalités d’accès aux médicaments en Afrique du Sud consiste dans la délégation —
paradoxale — de fonctions régulatoires à des acteurs non-étatiques, en particulier - mais pas
seulement - les industriels. Les politiques du médicament dans les Etats globalisés néolibéraux
sont  caractérisées  par  leur  insertion  dans  un  système  commercial  mondial  qui  promeut  la
marchandisation  croissante  des  médicaments.  Parallèlement,  les  demandes  de  réforme  des
politiques  du  médicament  conduites  au  niveau  national  ont  crû  de  manière  significative.  La
formation de l’Etat sud-africain a été marquée par des négociations continues et des compromis
avec les entreprises, ce qui pourrait sembler susceptible, de prime abord, de remettre en cause la
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possibilité-même de mettre en œuvre des politiques d’accès aux médicaments. Lorsqu’on ouvre la
boîte noire de l’Etat sud-africain, on peut constater que l’Etat s’emploie à mettre en œuvre un
projet politique visant à ce que l’industrie pharmaceutique adopte le principe de l’accès universel
aux médicaments dans un contexte néolibéral. Cet article met en lumière les mécanismes d’accès
aux médicaments en analysant le marché public des traitements antiviraux comme un ensemble
de relations sociales entremêlées. En Afrique du Sud, le rôle des industriels — quelle que soit leur
hétérogénéité — a été profondément ambigu, et dénoncé à ce titre par la société civile. Toutefois,
le  rôle  de  l’industrie  pharmaceutique  a  été  décisif  pour  garantir  l’approvisionnement  en
médicaments. Il en résulte que le Ministère de la santé sud-africain a été largement dépendant
des  industriels  en  ce  qui  concerne  aussi  bien  l’innovation  que  la  sécurisation  de
l’approvisionnement et le développement industriel. 
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